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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 As the global economy suffers through the 2011 Eurozone crisis, the International 
Monetary Fund, also known as the Fund or the IMF, has once again been brought to the 
forefront of the international stage in their attempts to fix the ever worrisome debt 
problems facing Greece, Italy, Spain, and others. In the not-so-distant-past it would have 
been inconceivable for a developed European economy to require assistance from the 
IMF. While the IMF has, and continues to, adapt to fit the needs of countries facing 
balance of payments crises, the institution’s impacts range far beyond macroeconomic 
indicators. The IMF has typically spent its time fixing crises in middle and low income 
countries across the globe, and in doing so has influenced their political, social and 
economic elements with mixed results. Given the level of involvement with these lower 
and middle income countries, it is imperative to look at how the IMF has impacted their 
income inequality and poverty levels to fully determine the outcomes that their programs 
and conditions have had. This paper will focus specifically on this relationship between 
IMF fiscal policy conditions and income inequality in Latin America. 
A Brief History of the IMF 
The International Monetary Fund was originally created in 1944 during the 
Bretton Woods Conference and formally established in December of 1945.1 Under the 
IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the role of the IMF was to “promote international monetary 
cooperation” and to “correct maladjustments in [countries’] balance of payments.”2 These 
                                                             
1 "About the IMF: History: Cooperation and Reconstruction (1944–71)," IMF -- International Monetary 
Fund Home Page. Accessed November 26, 2011. http://www.imf.org/external/about/histcoop.htm.  
2 International Monetary Fund Handbook - Its Functions, Policies, and Operations, edited by Bernhand 
Fritz-Krockow and Parmeshwar Ramlogan, Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2007. 
Accessed November 26, 2011. 1. 
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statements, while still applicable today, were referring to the IMF’s role of overseeing the 
operations of the newly created Bretton Woods system. Under the Bretton Woods system, 
countries agreed to peg their currencies to the United States dollar, which was tied to the 
value of gold. By only allowing the pegged exchange rate to be adjusted during 
fundamental disequilibrium, the global monetary system would be able to avoid the 
beggar-thy-neighbor policies adopted after the Great Depression, while still allowing 
countries to adjust their exchange rates to avoid major balance of payments crises.3 
During the 1950s and 1960s, the global economy continued to grow, and has been called 
the “golden age” for the IMF, as they were credited with the success of this period. 
Whether this credit was deserved is a debated topic.4 The Bretton-Woods system 
continued to work well until 1971 when the United States ended the dollar’s ability to be 
converted into gold. This led to the demise of the Bretton Woods System, and the 
emergence of global floating exchange rates in 1973.5 After the 1973-1974 oil shock, 
private banks received huge deposits from rich, oil-exporting countries, and therefore 
were able to provide a significantly higher amount of private sector lending.6 Without the 
Bretton Woods system to manage, and countries being able to easily borrow from private 
banks, the IMF did not have a significant global role until the beginning of the 1980s and 
the Third World Debt Crisis.  
The Third World Debt Crisis, also referred to as the Latin America debt crisis, 
was the result of a huge increase in private sector lending from the 1970s to 1982 to less 
                                                             
3 Graham Bird. "The IMF: A Bird's Eye View Of Its Role And Operations." Journal of Economic Surveys 
21, no. 4 (2007), 686. 
4 Ibid.  686. 
5 "About the IMF: History: The End of the Bretton Woods System (1972–81)." IMF -- International 
Monetary Fund Home Page. Accessed November 26, 2011. http://www.imf.org/external/about/histend.htm.  
6 Bird, IMF: A Bird’s Eye View, 687. 
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developed countries (LDCs). This increase in lending was promoted by the increase in 
global integration, the influx of petro dollars into the financial system, and the increased 
demand for loans from developing countries.7 The total amount of debt in developing 
countries increased from $180 billion in 1975 to $406 billion in 1979.8 In 1981, 
international banks had already halted their flow of money into a number of countries 
including Hungary, Morocco, Poland and Yugoslavia,9 However, it was not until 1982, 
when Mexico “announced that its central bank had run out of foreign reserves and that it 
could no longer meets payments on its foreign debt” that the situation turned into a crisis. 
This was because foreign banks recognized that a number of other Latin American 
countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, and Chile were in similar situations to Mexico and 
therefore cut all lending to those countries and demanded repayment of previous loans.10 
Due to the halt in capital flows to Latin American countries and others around the world, 
the crisis continued to spread until “more than 40 countries had encountered severe 
external financing problems” by 1986.11 This crisis was pivotal for the role of the IMF, as 
it officially became the “international crisis manager” from that point on.12  
The Third World Debt crisis was followed by a series of crises throughout the 
1990s and into the early 2000s. The most severe crises during this time period were the 
1997 Asian Financial Crises, which this paper is outside of the scope of this papre and the 
                                                             
7 Manuel Pastor, and Gary A. Dymski. "Debt Crisis and Class Conflict in Latin America." Capital & Class 
15, no. 1 (1991), 203-31.  
8 Michael P. Todaro, and Stephen C. Smith. Economic Development. Boston: Pearson Addison Wesley, 
2006, 676-677. 
9 James Boughton. "The IMF and the Force of History: Ten Events and Ten Ideas That Have Shaped the 
Institution." IDEAS: Economics and Finance Research. Accessed November 26, 2011. 
http://ideas.repec.org/p/imf/imfwpa/04-75.html., 12. 
10Paul R Krugman, Maurice Obstfeld, and Marc J. Melitz. International Economics: Theory & Policy. 
Boston: Pearson Addison-Wesley, 2012, 632. 
11 Ibid.  632 
12 Boughton, IMF and the Force of History, 12. 
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Mexican Peso Crisis in Latin America in 1994-1995. The Peso Crisis began when 
Mexico devalued its peso by 15 percent in 1994, leading to a panic by investors, which 
further decreased the value of the peso to 50 percent of its previous value. It wasn’t until 
the IMF stepped in and provided a $17.8 billion emergency loan that the country started 
to recover.13 The crises throughout Latin America during the 1980s will be further 
analyzed later in this paper in the context of IMF fiscal conditions, and their 
consequences for income inequality. 
IMF Conditionality and Structural Adjustment Programs 
The 1980s and 1990s were crucial decades for the IMF as the institution changed 
to address the crises during this period. One of the most important ways in which they 
changed was their usage of conditionality attached to their loans. The IMF significantly 
increased the number and scope of conditions as well as started to implement structural 
adjustment programs during these two decades, but have since started to reduce the 
number of conditions though a streamlining process.14 Before further addressing these 
new changes and structural adjustments, it is important to understand the purpose behind 
conditionality. 
Conditions were not originally a part of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, but 
were instead added in 1952. The rationale behind their existence stems from Article 1 of 
the Agreements, which states that the IMF will “give confidence to members by making 
the Fund’s resource temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards.” 
                                                             
13 Riordan Roett. The Mexican Peso Crisis: International Perspectives. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1996,  2 & 24. 
14 Graham Bird. "Reforming IMF Conditionality - From 'streamlining' to 'major Overhaul'" World 
Economics 10, no. 3 (September 2009), Accessed November 26, 2011. 
http://www.relooney.info/0_New_5922.pdf., 81. 
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Essentially conditions are the safeguards that will ensure every country that receives an 
IMF loan will have the economic ability to repay it.15 It has also been argued that IMF 
conditionality is used as a way of reducing moral hazard by increasing the costs 
associated with borrowing from the IMF.16 
 In addition to getting repaid and reducing moral hazard, the IMF’s goal for 
conditionality is to fix the problems that caused the balance of payments disequilibrium 
in the first place. The IMF will only become involved with a country if there is a 
demonstrated balance of payments need. This need occurs “whenever the sum total of 
demands for resources in an economy exceeds the amount of those resources that can be 
generated internally plus those that can be attracted from abroad.”17 If the country 
demonstrates this need and approaches the IMF, it must then accept the IMF conditions, 
which are defined as the “policies a member must adopt to secure access to Fund 
resources.”18 There are three components to conditionality. The least demanding of these 
components is the government must sign a letter of intent to receive the funds. The 
second component requires the completion of prior actions before receiving the loans. 
The third component is “quantified ‘performance criteria’ which are used to provide an 
objective indication of whether the agreed upon programme of economy policy reform is 
on track.”19 These performance criteria must be met in order for other tranches, or 
additional amounts of the loan, to be given to the country. 
                                                             
15 Ariel Buira,.An Analysis of IMF Conditionality. University of Oxford, Economics Department, 2002, 3. 
16 Bird, Reforming IMF Conditionality, 84. 
17 Ibid. 798. 
18 Buira, An Analysis of IMF Conditionality, 3. 
19 Bird, IMF: A Bird’s Eye View, 705. 
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In most cases, countries receiving loans from the IMF have pursued expansionary 
fiscal and monetary policies to stimulate the economy during a downturn. This creates an 
increase in aggregate demand, and this leads to a balance of payments deficit.20 Based on 
the objectives for conditionality, IMF conditions have tended to focus on reducing fiscal 
imbalances and restraints on monetary expansion in order to reduce aggregate demand.21 
These conditions result in policies that attempt to increase public sector revenues through 
increased taxation, and limit pubic expenditures associated with wages/salaries, 
government employment, subsidies, capital expenditures and state enterprises.22 
According to a 1986 review by the IMF of 94 programs from 1980-1984, the totals 
showed “91 percent containing measures to restrain government expenditure, and 96 
percent measures to increase revenues.”23 These types of conditions were the main form 
of conditionality until the structural adjustments programs were initiated in the mid-
1980s.  
The implementation of IMF structural adjustment programs came during a period 
with significant increases in the number of conditions being attached to IMF loans.24 This 
increase in conditions occurred for a number of reasons including: an increase in 
confidence about the correctness of economic policy recommendations, the positive 
signal given to private capital markets due to a strong commitment to policy reform, and 
to further decrease the potential problem of moral hazard as mentioned previously.25 
                                                             
20 Buira, An Analysis of IMF Conditionality, 13. 
21 Bird, IMF: A Bird’s Eye View, 706. 
22 Buira, An Analysis of IMF Conditionality, 13. 
23 Charles Sisson. "Fund-supported Programs and Income Distribution in LDCs." Finance and 
Development, March 1986,  2. 
24 Buira, An Analysis of IMF Conditionality, 16. 
25 Bird, IMF: A Bird’s Eye View, 709. 
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With the IMF determining that higher numbers of conditions was the best way of 
ensuring the structural reform of countries’ economies, the IMF structural adjustment 
programs were a natural fit.  
These IMF structural adjustment programs were designed to “permit adjustment 
to occur without there being an adverse effect on economic growth.” By allowing for 
lending over a longer period of time, adjustments could be implemented gradually and 
therefore still fix balance of payments problems, but without the negative impact on 
growth.26 This rationale fit well with the overwhelming and complex problems in 
developing countries’ economies, as well as the newly formed countries-in-transition 
after the fall of the Soviet Union.27 Structural adjustment programs were also the perfect 
way of incorporating the “neo-liberal economic stance and increasingly favored policies 
aimed at reducing the role of the state: the reduction or elimination of subsidies, market 
liberalization and privatization of public enterprises” that had been adopted by the United 
States and the United Kingdom during this period.28 Therefore structural adjustment 
allowed for the combination of “supply-side measures with more conventional 
components of conditionality” such as reducing fiscal deficits and monetary expansion.29 
This paper will later examine the effects of IMF structural adjustment programs and the 
rise of conditionality on income inequality in Latin America. 
                                                             
26 Graham Bird, and Paul Mosley. "Should the IMF Discontinue Its Long-term Lending Role in Developing 
Countries?" In Globalization and the Nation State: the Impact of the IMF and the World Bank, edited by 
Gustav Ranis, James Raymond Vreeland, and Stephen Kosack. London: Routledge, 2006. Accessed 
November 26, 2011.  381. 
27 Bird, Reforming IMF Conditionality, 89. 
28 Buira, Analysis of IMF Conditionality, 16. 
29 Bird, IMF: A Bird’s Eye View, 706. 
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While the rationale behind the structural adjustment programs and the rise in 
conditions may have been sound, there was a lack of ownership by the countries’ 
governments of the programs, which led to poor results and a general lack of compliance. 
With higher numbers of conditions attached to IMF loans, countries felt less compelled to 
achieve them and the end result led to a 20 percent decline in compliance from the 1970s 
to the 1990s.30 Both the issues of ownership and compliance are crucial when examining 
what impacts IMF fiscal conditions have on income inequality. 
Latin America and the Importance of Income Inequality 
This paper aims to analyze the link between IMF fiscal policy conditions and its 
impacts on income inequality, but first it is essential to understand why income inequality 
is an important issue, and how it affects both the IMF’s goals and the overall 
development of the borrowing country. According to an article in the September 2011 
issue of Finance and Development, higher levels of income inequality lead to higher 
levels of domestic and foreign indebtedness. This occurs because governments tend to 
“prop up the living standards of the bottom group” by making it cheaper to borrow, rather 
than confronting the underlying causes of the inequality.31 Increasing debt levels are 
exactly what the IMF is trying to avoid, and therefore this is a compelling reason for the 
IMF to address the inequality issue. Additionally, Alberto Alesina and Roberto Perotti 
find that income inequality leads to increases in socio-political instability. This instability 
decreases the levels of investment in the country, thus lowering its growth.32 These 
                                                             
30 Buira, Analysis of IMF Conditionality, 19. 
31 Laurence Ball, Daniel Leigh, and Prakash Loungani. "Finance & Development, September 2011 - 
Painful Medicine." IMF -- International Monetary Fund Home Page. September 2011. Accessed November 
27, 2011. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2011/09/Ball.htm.  26. 
32 Alberto Alesina, and Roberto Perotti. "Income Distribution, Political Instability, and Investment." 
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findings are easily supported with current events around the globe, from the education 
strikes in Chile to the Occupy Wall Street movement to the Arab Spring Revolutions. 
Inequality is an especially important topic in Latin America. It was ranked second 
in regional inequality, behind only sub-Saharan Africa in 2006 and inequality permeates 
every aspect of daily life.33 Income distribution resembles a reverse pyramid, and “the 
allocation of goods, services, and basic opportunities is equally unbalanced.”34 With 
inequality playing major role in all economic, political and social factors in Latin 
American society, it is impossible to ignore, especially given the potential consequences 
this inequality may have in the future. Given the large income inequality this region has, 
it is worthwhile to focus on Latin America for this paper. By analyzing the effects that 
IMF fiscal conditions have had on Latin America as a region and individual countries, it 
may be possible to draw conclusions about what has gone wrong, and to provide 
recommendations for how the situation can be improved in the future.   
 This paper will analyze the effects of IMF fiscal policy conditions on income 
inequality and poverty in Latin America. It will first draw upon the general literature to 
provide context and insight into the relationship between IMF conditions and inequality. 
The following sections will present a more in-depth analysis of Latin America and look 
specifically at the case of Mexico during the 1982 Third World Debt Crisis. The final 
section will address recent developments by the IMF towards improving their 
conditionality to better income inequality and to provide policy recommendations.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
European Economic Review 40, no. 6 (1996), 1204. 
33 Edwin J. Goñi, Humberto López, and Luis Servén. "Fiscal Redistribution and Income Inequality in Latin 
America." World Development 39, no. 9 (2011), 1558. 
34 Kelly Hoffman, and Miguel Centeno. "The Lopsided Continent: Inequality in Latin America." Annual 
Review of Sociology 29 (2003), Accessed November 26, 2011. www.jstor.org/stable/30036972.  363. 
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CHAPTER 2: GENERAL REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 While the role of the International Monetary Fund has always been to help fix 
balance of payment disequilibria, its impacts beyond these macroeconomic indicators 
have not gone unexamined. The IMF has never been or claimed to be a development 
agency, unlike the World Bank, yet the “stark reality is that there is no sharp dividing 
line” between fixing a country’s balance of payments problems and helping the country 
develop.35 This lack of clear distinction has prompted many to scrutinize the Fund’s 
programs, especially their conditionality, and their effects on income distribution and 
poverty.  
This section will focus on the general literature regarding two main issues of IMF 
conditionality and income inequality. The first is examining the relationship that exists 
between IMF fiscal policy conditions and their impacts on income inequality and 
poverty. A number of scholars working for and independently of the Fund have attempted 
to empirically determine if there is an adverse effect on income distribution and the poor. 
This paper will use the general literature to examine whether or not IMF fiscal conditions 
have indeed hurt income inequality. While there are numerous factors (explained later in 
this section) that make the analysis of this relationship extremely difficult and impossible 
to measure with 100 percent accuracy, it is still valuable to examine and understand the 
arguments presented. This analysis, despite its imperfections, brings crucial awareness of 
issues regarding income inequality and the IMF, and provides a basis for bettering the 
Fund’s conditions in the future. 
                                                             
35 Bird and Mosley, Should the IMF Discontinue its Long-Term Lending, 394. 
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The second issue is the role of internal politics within the borrowing countries in 
the development and implementation of IMF fiscal policy conditions. Countries are given 
a large degree of control over the implementation of IMF conditions and those receiving 
loans from the IMF have varying degrees of negotiating power based on their size and 
ability to access international capital markets.36 This gives the government significant 
influence over who receives the benefits of the reforms, and ultimately what 
redistribution of income occurs. Therefore, it is essential to try and better understand the 
role that internal politics play in the resulting changes in income inequality. This paper 
will use the general literature to examine whether or not internal politics of borrowing 
countries have played a significant role in adversely affecting income inequality. 
By examining the general literature regarding IMF conditionality and income 
inequality, there will be a greater context in which to analyze the specific cases within 
Latin America. This will be especially useful when examining the role of internal politics 
on income inequality, as the factors involved cannot be empirically evaluated unlike the 
broad relationship between IMF fiscal conditions and income inequality. Both elements 
will be reviewed more extensively in the following chapters. 
IMF Fiscal Policy Conditions and Income Inequality 
This section will review the general literature regarding IMF conditions and their 
impact on income inequality. Through this review, it will be possible to view the major 
arguments that have been presented, and draw broad conclusions about whether or not 
                                                             
36 Buira, Analysis of IMF Conditionality, 4. 
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IMF fiscal policy conditions have indeed adversely impacted income inequality. It will 
also touch on the scale of these consequences.  
 Before diving into the literature, it is important to understand the limitations that 
are present when trying to evaluate the relationship between IMF fiscal conditions and 
income inequality. Since this paper will not be examining the specific empirical 
methodologies used in the literature, it is valuable to look at some of the challenges these 
experts are trying to overcome during their analyses. There are two main challenges 
present: 1) the problem of the counterfactual and 2) determining changes in income 
inequality within a country during and after an IMF program and then attributing those 
changes to IMF conditionality. 
 The biggest problem facing researchers is the counterfactual, or determining what 
would have happened if the IMF had not given the country a loan or imposed certain 
conditions.37 Essentially, there is no way of determining the exact impact of the IMF 
conditions because it is impossible to know what would have happened if the IMF had 
not become involved.38 That being said, it is still possible for researchers to conduct 
empirical analyses on the topic, and determine meaningful results. All results must 
simply be qualified by stating that due to the counterfactual issue, it is impossible to 
determine if these results are 100 percent accurate.  
The second challenge results from a lack of the appropriate data and imperfect 
methodologies. According to Omotunde Johnson and Joanne Salop in their article 
                                                             
37 Graham Bird. "Growth, Poverty and the IMF." Journal of International Development 16, no. 4 (2004), 
628. 
38 Bird and Mosley, Should the IMF Discontinue its Long-Term Lending, 381. 
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“Distributional Aspects of Stabilization Programs in Developing Countries” the ideal data 
set would “provide the distribution of income both prior to and at some time after the 
implementation of a program.” Unfortunately this data does not exist and therefore the 
use of proxy variables is required.39 Additionally, the lack of available and reliable data 
in most developing countries makes it is extremely difficult to create accurate results.40 
Fortunately, data collection continues to improve and therefore future results are likely to 
be more accurate than the ones examined in this paper.  
 Determining the appropriate methodology to attribute changes in income 
inequality to the IMF conditions is also an extremely difficult task. The most intuitive 
method would simply be to look at income inequality before and after the IMF program, 
but this leaves the very large problem of trying to determine exactly what affect the IMF 
fiscal policy conditions had rather than other factors involved. Another issue is the 
timeframe used to determine the effect. Ideally the timeframe would be long enough for a 
new equilibrium to be reached in the economy, thus allowing the full effects to be 
present. Unfortunately this does not make practical sense and therefore imperfect 
timeframes, often determined by the availability of reliable data, are used.41 Selection 
bias has also posed a problem for researchers. In an ideal experiment, the subjects are 
chosen at random, whereas the countries that seek IMF assistance do so because they all 
have severe balance of payments disequilibria. This presents the challenge of determining 
whether or not changes in income inequality are the result of the underlying factors of 
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these countries, or the IMF fiscal policy conditions.42 Despite these challenges, there are 
a number of studies that attempt to empirically determine the link between IMF fiscal 
conditions and income inequality. While none are perfect, they still provide a valuable 
insight into the effects that IMF conditions have on income inequality.  
Although the topic of IMF consequences on income distribution had been debated 
in the past, the first significant analysis was conducted and published by the Fund in 
1986. This review, Fund-Supported Programs, Fiscal Policy and Income Distribution, 
concludes that “Fund-supported programs have improved rather than worsened income 
distribution.”43 The report does acknowledge that their structural adjustment programs 
have been controversial in regards to income inequality and poverty, but defends the IMF 
policies by stating “the income distribution has not necessarily been made more 
regressive as higher income groups may be affected more” and without those programs 
the income disparity could have become “even more drastic.”44 The IMF also addresses 
specific conditions regarding taxation, public expenditures, debt financing, subsidies and 
state enterprises and finds that there is “little reason to believe that these programs lead to 
any increase in income inequality… [or] any significant decrease in living standards of 
the poorest quartile.”45 While these conclusions support the actions of the IMF, it is also 
difficult to imagine that they would produce anything that shed a negative light on their 
fairly new structural adjustment programs.      
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Following the IMF’s review, an influential study was conducted by Manuel Pastor 
in 1987, which reviewed 18 Latin American countries from 1965 – 1981.46  It was the 
first large scale empirical analyses that attempted to determine a link between IMF 
conditionality and income distribution. Pastor argues that the strongest and most 
significant effects of the Fund programs were associated with the decline in wages and 
the labor share of income.47 The article states that IMF programs have led to nominal 
wage restraints on government workers, which have reduced the labor share of income 
and furthered the redistribution away from workers.48 The article also makes the claims 
that IMF conditions that force the decrease in government expenditures hurt the non-elite 
the most, and this exacerbation in class conflict and income distribution can lead to 
extreme social tensions and political conflict.49 While these particular claims are largely 
unsubstantiated in his article, they pose the interesting question of the role that the elites 
and internal politics play in redistribution. This topic will be covered in further depth 
later in this chapter. 
In 2000, Gopal Garuda conducted another, more empirically sound, study 
focusing on 58 IMF programs from 1975-1991.50 The paper examines the effects of 
“currency devaluation, reductions in the budget deficit, changes in growth rates and 
changes in inflation rates” on income inequality through analyzing countries’ GINI 
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coefficients.51  The results show that countries with severe balance of payments problems 
that receive IMF loans “show 10-20 percentage point declines in distribution measures 
relative to control group countries.”52 This increase in income inequality often results 
from aggregate demand reducing policies, which include “cuts in government 
expenditure, increases in levels of taxation, reductions in real wages, and credit 
restraints.” These policies prompt nominal wage cuts and reductions in public sector 
employment, which tend to “increase poverty and worsen the skew of income.”53 This 
paper further emphasizes the role that fiscal policy changes determined by IMF loan 
conditions play in income inequality and poverty. 
 James Vreeland’s 2001 paper, “The Effect of IMF Programs on Labor”, uses 
2,095 observations of 110 countries from 1961-1993 to analyze the role of IMF programs 
on labor’s share of income in the manufacturing sector.54 Vreeland finds that “when 
countries enter IMF programs, labor share plummets and as participation continues it 
seems to trend downward.”55 This decrease in labor share in due to IMF conditions for a 
reduction in public expenditure. This occurs though “wage freezes, limits on 
employment, and reduced benefits for public employees.”56 Vreeland’s findings reinforce 
the previous findings of Garuda and Pastor but then delve further into why this income 
inequality occurs. The paper demonstrates that not only does labor’s share of income 
decrease but capital’s share of income increases.57 This is significant because the owners 
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of capital (who tend to be better off in the first place) are therefore hurt less by IMF 
conditions than their labor force thus widening the income gap in both directions. 
Vreeland definitively concludes by stating “IMF programs have negative distributional 
consequences”58, and “the negative effects of IMF programs on economic growth are 
paid for by the least well-off in a country.”59  
 While there has been significant evidence demonstrating that IMF fiscal policy 
conditions have indeed had negative income distribution effects, these consequences are 
still debated, and their entirety is not fully known or understood. In Graham Bird’s article 
“Growth, Poverty and the IMF,” he claims that countries that have pursued IMF 
structural adjustment programs have a “more ‘pro-poor’ mix of stabilization polices... 
[and] government expenditure on health and education seems to be more protected and 
regressive tax policies less likely.” These factors result in a moderation of income 
inequality.60 William Easterly has concluded that the main result from IMF conditions is 
that they lower the “growth elasticity of poverty.” This means the poor will benefit less 
from economic growth under structural adjustment, but they will not be hurt as badly 
during a period of recession.61 Omotunde Johnson and Joanne Salop conclude that “the 
brunt of any downward adjustment of government expenditure to GDP is most commonly 
borne by public sector employees engaged in projects that come to be postponed.”62  
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These mix of views and findings fuel the debate over the actual consequences that 
IMF conditions may have on income inequality. With the methodological and data 
problems associated with such large scale analyses presented above, it is extremely 
difficult to draw any firm general conclusions. Additionally, Heller et al. observe that 
without a more disaggregated analysis, it is almost impossible to truly understand the 
consequences on income inequality. They use the example of cutting funding in the 
education sector. If the cuts are at the university level or for primary education, the 
distributional impacts will be very different. Similarly, it is important to not only view the 
amount of cuts, but to “assess the impact on the quality and quantity of services 
delivered.”63 Therefore, in order to gain a better understanding of the IMF fiscal policy 
conditions it is necessary to take a more specific approach and analyze the specific 
outcomes at a regional and country specific level. The following chapters will attempt to 
do this for Latin America, and then Mexico specifically. 
Internal Politics and Fiscal Policy Implementation 
While a conclusive answer has yet to be provided over the consequences of IMF 
fiscal policy conditions on income inequality, it is essential to analyze and understand the 
role that the government of the borrowing country plays when determining how the fiscal 
policy is actually implemented. The IMF imposes fiscal policy conditions on the 
borrowing country, but these conditions rarely have specific actions that countries must 
take. In fact, only 3 of 94 programs from 1980-1984 have an “explicit reference to a 
government functional expenditure and less than one third of the programs refers to 
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government functional expenditure policies at all.”64 The IMF is able to encourage fiscal 
reform without specifically referring to fiscal policies by “placing limitations on credit to 
the government and the acquisition of new foreign debt.”65 This forces the government to 
fix their fiscal deficit in order to maintain financial viability. The IMF also allows the 
government to determine how it is going to fix its fiscal deficit because it is extremely 
difficult for them to determine how much spending is too much in any given sector.66 The 
borrowing government therefore has to cut spending or raise revenues, but is allowed to 
determine how this takes place. It is critical to analyze what role internal politics and the 
favoritism of the elite plays in the government’s decisions, and whether those decisions 
adversely affect income inequality and the poor.  
The general literature demonstrates that the government’s decisions do play a 
very important role in determining the consequences on the country’s income inequality. 
Sidney Dell points out that the “causes of distributional outcomes ‘lie more in the realm 
of politics than economics.’”67 Domestic political decisions “largely determine who bears 
the burden of reducing and restructuring aggregate demand.”68 The government has the 
ability to determine the “composition of the budget cuts,” and the resulting income 
inequality will depend on that composition.69 The most direct manner in which this 
composition could significantly hurt the poor and increase income inequality is by cutting 
social programs that target the poor.70  This allocation also plays a significant role when 
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determining which public sector jobs are going to be cut. Income distribution will 
become more equal if high paid upper level government employees are cut, whereas if 
only low level government jobs are cut income inequality will become worse.71 
Therefore, the government plays a crucial role in determining who is affected by the 
fiscal changes prompted by IMF conditions. 
Given this link between government decisions and income inequality outcomes, it 
is important to understand how and why governments make the decisions that they do 
regarding their changes in fiscal policy. The main argument posed by numerous scholars 
is that governments make their decisions based on ensuring the continued support of the 
local elite. One reason for this is that in order for a country to reach an agreement with 
the IMF, it must get the support of these elite and this is often achieved by promising 
them they will not bear the costs of the adjustments.72 Due to the IMF's desire to “secure 
the cooperation of local elites [it] may lead them to design programs which place the 
burden of adjustment on workers and other ‘popular classes.’”73 Therefore, the 
governmental authorities do not have complete control over the fiscal policies they 
ultimately implement. Instead, “the choice of policy instruments will be influenced by the 
political power of various income groups.”74 The likely result will be that the government 
will cut basic social services and the “’social wage’ will decline further and distributional 
consequences will be worse.”75 While the government does also take into account the 
“causes of the balance of payments problem and of the effects of different policy 
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instruments” into its decisions, the influences of the elite often ensure that they remain 
relatively unhurt by the policy outcomes.76  
 Although the IMF officially maintains that income distribution outcomes are an 
“internal political concern,” they have always been indirectly concerned with how their 
programs affect income inequality and resource allocation issues. This is partly due to the 
fact that the complexity of the topic makes it challenging for the IMF to address.77 It is 
extremely difficult to empirically evaluate the true effect of IMF conditions on income 
inequality due to poor access to information, and the problem of the counterfactual.  
However, the general literature has generally found that the impacts of IMF conditions on 
the fiscal policies of borrowing countries can have direct negative consequences on 
income inequality and poverty within the country involved. While IMF conditionality is 
often blamed for these adverse effects, the governments of borrowing countries also play 
a significant role in determining the changes in income inequality. This often occurs 
when the government implements IMF programs to protect certain groups of 
constituencies, which have “disproportionately served the interests of the middle- and 
upper-income groups rather than the poor.”7879 The general literature provides a basic 
understanding of the problems associated with the IMF, internal politics and income 
equality, but does not fully explain the intricacies of these relationships. The following 
chapters will attempt to accomplish this in the context of Latin America. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE IMF, LATIN AMERICA, AND INCOME INEQUALITY 
 The IMF has been actively lending across the globe since its founding, but its 
involvement in Latin America was vastly increased after the 1982 Latin America Debt 
Crisis. To illustrate this point, in 1983 almost three quarters of Latin American countries 
were under IMF programs, compared with less than one-third in the 1970s.80 This was 
not only a momentous change between the IMF and the region, but for the IMF itself. 
Before the crisis, the IMF had mainly only lent to small low-income countries in Africa 
and East Asia. The 1982 crisis not only allowed the Fund to diversify its portfolio of 
countries, but solidify its role in the international community as a crisis managing 
institution.81 Given the significance of the Latin American crisis, for both the continent 
and the IMF, it is valuable to examine the causes leading to the crisis, the response by the 
IMF, and the resulting outcomes on income inequality and poverty in the region. This 
section will also analyze the role of national politics and various interest groups in 
determining the successes and failures of the implementation of IMF fiscal conditionality. 
 The Latin American debt crisis emerged from the huge boom in international 
lending that occurred during the period of 1974-1979. With the recycling of OPEC petrol 
dollars following a price spike in 1973, Latin American countries continued to use cheap 
capital to fund their growth, becoming further indebted, and eventually leading to the 
crisis in August 1982 when Mexico announced it could no longer pay its debts.82 While 
this is the broad story behind the crisis, there are a number of other factors that spurred 
this increase in borrowing in addition to the fact that the money was easily available. 
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Pastor and Dyrnski state that financial internationalization and the slow growth of 
advanced economies were substantial contributing factors.83 As the growth in developed 
countries started to decline, this reduced the amount of imports they were willing to 
purchase, and Latin America suffered the most as a consequence of these changes.84 
Additionally, Krugman et al. point to the U.S. dollar’s significant appreciation after 1981, 
which “raised the real value of the dollar debt burden substantially.”85 This only 
exacerbated the already high levels of debt the Latin American countries had been 
obtaining.      
 These numerous external factors clearly influenced the excessive borrowing in 
Latin America, but it does not fully explain the rationale for the Latin American countries 
themselves. Berg and Sachs argue that the large amount of borrowing was the not the 
result of strategic economic calculations but “the political needs of the incumbent 
government” as a way to “satisfy intense social demands for higher government spending 
without having to suffer (in the short-term) the political consequences of higher tax” 
rates.86 This rationale makes logical sense, and is consistent with almost every other large 
fiscal deficit in the world. The government wants to gain social favor by providing 
additional services, but does not want to pay for them. However, Berg and Sachs delve 
further into why Latin American countries specifically had such high debt levels. They 
suggest that the prevalence of extreme income inequality in Latin America lead to “little 
commonality of interests” and a conflict between higher pressure for redistributive 
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policies and the wealthy class’ ability to resist these pressures given their more influential 
position in society.87 Therefore, the internal demand for government spending caused by 
income inequality coupled with the large prevalence of international funding and the 
harmful economic shifts from the United States and other developed countries all 
contributed to the 1982 Latin American Debt Crisis. Now that the underlying factors 
behind the crisis have been addressed, it is possible to examine the policy responses by 
the IMF and the Latin American countries, and the outcomes of those decisions on 
income inequality and poverty. 
IMF Conditionality and Latin American Structural Adjustments 
 In the years following the Latin American Debt Crisis, the IMF increased the 
number of conditions attached to their Standby arrangements and Extended Fund Facility 
(EFF) loans from approximately “six in the 1970s to 10 in the 1980s.”88 While these IMF 
loans were designed to fix balance of payments problems, they did not address growth. 
The term “stabilization” or “stabilization program” is often used for these short term 
policy changes to fix a balance of payments deficit.89 This eventually led to the 
implementation of the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) and Enhanced Structural 
Adjustment Facility (ESAF) in 1986 and 1987 respectively. The SAF and ESAF were 
designed to promote growth through three year longer term structural adjustments in 
addition to fixing the immediate balance of payments problems faced by the countries.90 
In the case of Latin America, poorer countries such as Bolivia, Honduras and Nicaragua 
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utilized the SAF/ESAF loans, whereas the middle income countries such as Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile and Mexico only used the Standby and EFF loans. With the IMF doing its 
best to adapt to the needs of its member countries, there were still a number of problems 
that faced Latin American countries during this period. 
  One of the biggest problems that countries in Latin America were facing when 
approaching the IMF for assistance was their huge fiscal deficits caused by the excessive 
debt built up during the 1970s. Therefore, one of the main focuses of IMF conditions was 
on fixing these fiscal deficits. Critics, such as Pastor, disagree with the “excessive 
attention to fiscal measures” stating that “a deliberate attempt to reduce fiscal deficits in 
the midst of [a] global slowdown is a reckless pro-cyclical policy.”91 While the criticism 
may be valid, there are limited alternative options for countries to take to fully address 
their growing debt levels and fiscal deficits. 
There are two ways to fix a fiscal deficit: increase government revenues through 
increased taxation, or decrease government expenditures. Ideally the government would 
be able to increase tax revenues by increasing rates of existing taxes and/or widening the 
base of existing taxes. However, in most countries tax rates were already quite high and 
broadening existing taxes was not a viable option. A more viable option was to introduce 
a new and broadly based tax, often in the form of a value-added tax (VAT).92 Bolivia 
introduced a successful VAT tax during its 1985 restructuring, and it “quickly became the 
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centerpiece of the new tax system.”93 Chile was also able to successfully implement a 
VAT tax, which increased its tax revenue by five percent of GDP.94  
Unfortunately successful taxation is not always the case. Increasing revenue in 
developing countries is extremely difficult due to the inadequacy of the necessary 
enforcement agencies to enact these changes. Heymann described the Argentine tax 
system as “that of a system without clear design, with complicated legislation that is not 
enforced, which cannot collect broad-based taxes and has to rely on a diversity of rather 
primitive taxes.”95 This is why the simplification of the tax code was so essential to the 
success of countries like Bolivia. By replacing the old and ineffective tax system and 
replacing it with more streamlined taxes, Bolivia was actually able to succeed at 
increasing its revenues.96 This results in the majority of changes occurring on the 
expenditure side. 
   Given the difficulties associated with collecting government revenues, the 
majority of fiscal reforms took place by decreasing government expenditures. The IMF 
Conditionality Guidelines implies that the IMF should “interfere as little as possible with 
the preferences of the borrower.”97 This has generally allowed the borrowing 
governments to determine how to specifically implement these budget cuts, leaving the 
IMF to only provide external advice. Cuts in fiscal spending tend to fall under four main 
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categories: government wage/employment levels, subsidies, state enterprises and capital 
expenditures.98 All four of these options provide the government with viable and 
effective means of cutting costs in the short run and for the long term benefit of the 
country if they are used appropriately. 
 The most used type of fiscal reductions involved reducing minimum wages, 
government employee salaries, and/or decreasing the number of government employees. 
This sector is an easy target for spending reductions given that on average more than 40 
percent of non-agricultural workers are employed by the government, and the 
government is the one that determines those salaries.99 For example, in 1990 Argentina 
announced that there would be a freeze on new hiring, anyone above the retirement age 
would be forced to leave, and they would eliminate 56 secretary of state positions.100 
These types of cuts, in addition to temporary wage and hiring freezes were common but 
were often ineffective.  This was partly because they made government jobs unappealing, 
and therefore made it difficult to hire the talented senior level officials necessary for the 
positions.101 Additionally, repeated attempts at wage freezes that occurred in Brazil and 
Argentina “encouraged private sector firms to increase prices preemptively” so as to 
mitigate the effects.102 Wage and hiring freezes were also largely unsuccessful due to the 
obvious political implications involved. In Bolivia, “politically powerful groups, such as 
the armed forces and workers in the education and health sectors” influenced government 
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decisions resulting in a negligible reduction in government employment.103 Therefore, 
while temporary wage and hiring freezes were common in Latin America, they did not 
have significant long term impacts on the fiscal budgets. 
 The reduction or elimination of government subsidies was another tool that 
governments used to try to fix their fiscal deficits. Subsidies, usually on food, petroleum 
or fertilizers, were used to keep prices low for the people, and were often touted as 
protecting the lower class.104 Under Fujimori, Peru eliminated a number of its subsidies 
in 1990 in an attempt to balance its budget.105 Brazil also reduced its subsidies of food 
and oil during this time. Historically, there has been a large debate about whether or not 
the reduction and elimination of subsidies disproportionately hurt the poor. While Sisson 
argues that the majority of subsidy benefits ultimately help the rich instead of the poor, 
subsidies still do have some benefit for the poor even if it is not as much as it should 
be.106 
 A third category of budget cuts regards government capital expenditures. Capital 
expenditures, also referred to as public investment, are normally spent on bigger projects 
like infrastructure, hospitals, etc. and therefore take a longer time to complete and are 
more expensive. Government capital expenditures also include “repair, maintenance, and 
other recurrent costs in order to attain greater efficiency in utilizing the existing capital 
stock, rather than creating new capital.”107 While some programs, such as those in Chile, 
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managed to increase the amount of public investment, the majority of countries in Latin 
America used capital expenditures as a short term means of cutting costs.108 For example 
in 1985, Bolivia enacted a one year halt on public investment, and Argentina during its 
IMF program in 1989 “announced a suspension of all state-funded public works.”109 
Cutting capital expenditure generally has low political costs, especially when 
governments reduce maintenance funding. Short term cuts on capital expenditures can 
also be the most damaging in the long-run for both the growth of the country, and the 
impacts on income inequality.  
Challenges to Fiscal Policy Reform 
Fiscal policy reforms face a significant variety of challenges, and are often never 
fully accomplished. Vito Tanzi elaborates on the extent of fiscal policy challenges by 
stating “tax evasion, inflation, and the proliferation of exonerations have reduced the 
government’s control of tax revenues, while political pressures, fragmentation of the 
public sector, and inadequate monitoring systems have undermined its ability to keep 
public expenditure in check.”110 Additionally, the fiscal policies changes that are 
ultimately implemented are not always the most economically beneficial, and thus do not 
always accomplish their goals of fixing the balance of payments problems and spurring 
growth in the country. This section will focus on the challenges that have faced fiscal 
policy reform in Latin America. It will also emphasize the political factors that can and 
have influenced these policy decisions. 
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Fiscal policy reforms have not had the success that IMF programs would suggest 
they should. This is often due to the fact that the specific allocation of fiscal policy cuts is 
not done in the most economically beneficial manner. This refers specifically to the rate 
of return on various government expenditures, and their effects on growth. If the 
government cuts programs that are beneficial to long-term and sustainable growth, such 
as capital expenditure, then it can hurt the economy in the medium and long term despite 
the initial decrease in the fiscal deficit.111 Interestingly, the IMF’s Independent 
Evaluation Office (IEO) has shown that the implementation of an “IMF-supported 
program does not reduce public spending in either health or education—measured as a 
share of total public spending, GDP, or in per capita real terms.”112 This is one example 
of governments choosing the right programs to keep. The ideal composition of budget 
cuts would be to eliminate the wasteful and inefficient programs of the public sector, and 
leave the efficient and beneficial programs untouched.  
While this composition would be ideal, it is highly unlikely that this will actually 
occur due to national politics and the vested interested of various groups that would be 
adversely affected in some way. All IMF programs, especially those referring to fiscal 
reform in Latin America, “do in fact serve the interest of the ruling groups” and other 
interest groups.113 A main factor behind the implemented fiscal policies that makes them 
different from the most economically sound options is the government’s general 
preference for short-sighted thinking rather than long-term planning. Governments have 
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short time horizons and short sighted thinking for a number of reasons, but especially 
because of their desire to maintain power. This occurred in Venezuela during the 1980s 
as their policy reforms reflected no strategy for redirecting spending other than making 
cuts in areas that were the easiest to achieve.114 One cost of pursuing stabilization policies 
is that the “short-run political costs [begin] to loom larger than the longer-run economic 
benefits” and political support for the program therefore declines.115 The austerity 
measures associated with fiscal policy reform can often be painful politically, and 
therefore the government generally chooses to pursue the reforms that have the most 
support from various interest groups. This ultimately leads to reforms that are not 
beneficial in the long run, but rather politically feasible in the short run. 
Internal politics also plays a large role in determining whether or not a country 
will comply with adjustment benchmarks set by the IMF, regardless of the fact that these 
benchmarks are often requirements for the country to continue receiving its loan. 
Hutchinson and Noi find that Latin America had significantly higher rates of recidivism, 
or repeated loans with the IMF, than other regions.116 Buira also notes that IMF 
conditionality compliance declines in a parallel manner with the increase in the number 
of loan conditions.117 The intuitive argument that with more conditions there will likely 
be more instances of incompliance stands true in this case. This high recidivism rate is 
also partially explained by the fact that as soon as an arrangement starts to “break down, 
the Fund immediately starts to negotiate a new program” and this previous lack of 
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compliance does not affect receiving new loans in the future.118 Given the lack of 
incentives for countries to meet the fiscal policy conditionality they agreed upon in order 
to receive the loan, governments choose to do what is in their best interests and often 
times it is the policymaker’s optimal policy choice to not push for the completion of these 
fiscal reforms.119 Without consequences in place, governments in Latin America have 
chosen to ignore their initial agreements with the IMF, and thus benefit politically from 
the softened fiscal policy impacts on the country.  
Income Inequality and Latin America 
 During stabilization policies and structural adjustments, countries in Latin 
America have neglected to address the effects that fiscal policies have on income 
inequality and the poor. As long as politicians maintain their support base, and the IMF is 
satisfied with their progress addressing their balance of payments problems, there is no 
reason to examine if the policy decisions may be ignoring the underlying expansion of 
“income distribution [and] exacerbated social tension.”120 In fact, governments are more 
than happy to enact policies that “create ‘rents’ for groups whose support the government 
need in order to stay in power” and completely ignore the future consequences on both 
the economy and income inequality in the future.121 It is important to note however that 
not all effects on income inequality should be attributed to IMF conditions and 
government implementation. Given the level of debt, and the severity of the crisis during 
the 1980s, Killick argues that “declines in real wages and consumption standards, and 
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increased proportions living in poverty…became inevitable.”122 While this may certainly 
be the case, it is highly likely that government policies exacerbated income inequality in 
Latin America. 
 Latin America suffered in the 1980s especially, with regional decline of 6.6 
percent in GDP per capita and a 16 percent decline in income per capita.123 While this 
decline impacted everyone, the poor were affected more than the wealthy. From 1980-
1985, the consumption per capita of the owners of capital rose by 16 percent whereas the 
consumption of labor declined by 25 percent.124 This demonstrates how despite the 
overall decline in growth in Latin America, the brunt of this decline was felt by the poor. 
An example of the rising inequality is Brazil, where  the “ratio of the top 10 percent to 
the bottom 40 percent rose from 5.1 in 1980 to 6.7 in 1990, with a similar increase based 
on per-capita household income.”125 This rise in income inequality was mirrored 
throughout the region. 
After the Latin American Debt Crisis, the IMF tried to help countries fix their 
massive debts by imposing conditions that would force them to reduce their fiscal 
deficits. These conditions generally gave countries the freedom to determine how they 
were actually going to implement these policies. Fiscal reform typically took place by 
increasing tax revenue through new broadly based taxes, and decreasing expenditures by 
reducing government salaries and employment, reducing subsidies, and cutting capital 
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expenditures. While fiscal adjustments were absolutely necessary for the countries to fix 
their high levels of foreign debt, the policy choices made were often short sighted and 
were determined based on their effects on political support, rather than long-term 
economic stability and growth. These decisions often resulted in countries not meeting 
the benchmarks set by the IMF, which should have resulted in the termination of the loan. 
However, this would ultimately never occur since the IMF would always renegotiate with 
those countries. This furthered the political motivations to avoid politically costly actions 
during stabilization reforms and policies. By avoiding the most economically and socially 
beneficial fiscal reforms, Latin American governments ultimately hurt income inequality 
and the poor.   
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CHAPTER 4: THE IMF AND MEXICO: 1980-1989 
 While analyzing Latin America as a whole brings the major issues regarding the 
IMF and income inequality to light, it is impossible to delve into the complexities and 
important details that occur during the process of negotiating loan conditions and the 
decisions behind how the borrowing country determines which fiscal policies to adapt 
after finally receiving the IMF loan. By focusing on the specific case of Mexico before, 
during, and after the 1982 crisis, it will be easier to understand these intricacies and gain 
a better insight into the rationale behind IMF and the Mexican governmental decisions, 
and how they ultimately impacted income inequality and the poor. 
 The 1982 crisis was a pivotal moment for the IMF and the global financial 
community in general. With Mexico’s announcement that it would not be able to pay its 
debts, the world faced its first serious threat of a global financial collapse. The IMF 
stepped in to help manage the crisis but this was essentially new territory for them as they 
had to balance the internal politics of Mexico, the interests of the United States, and 
foreign bank demands for repayment, all while trying to implement a loan package that 
would satisfy all parties involved before Mexico defaulted on its loans. This was an 
incredibly complicated task, and one that will be examined further in this chapter. 
 The implementation of the IMF’s conditions regarding fiscal reductions was also 
a complicated process. Internal politics, especially with the election of a new president, 
and an uncooperative private sector led to a lack of political will to fully implement 
painful fiscal cuts necessary to get the country out of the crisis. Instead, a large fiscal 
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reduction occurred, but not large enough to actually make the country’s economy grow 
again. This ultimately led to an increase in income inequality and poverty in the country.  
 Mexico is an interesting case study to examine the relationship between IMF 
conditions and income inequality due to the fact that the program negotiated was “one of 
the most severe austerity packages launched in Latin America during that period.”126  
Given that the 1982 crisis was the first real crisis to “threaten the stability of the [entire] 
international financial system” it was also one of the most urgent programs the IMF had 
ever undertaken.127 With high stakes and little time, the IMF loan to Mexico “introduced 
important innovations in the speed of negotiations, the role of structural elements in the 
policy adjustment program, the assembling of official financing packages, and…relations 
between the Fund and private creditors.”128 Mexico provides an excellent example of 
how the urgency in the face of a crisis and role of internal politics are highly influential in 
determining the number and depth of conditions attached to IMF loans. This example 
demonstrates how these factors determine whether or not the country ultimately follows 
through to meet those conditions, and what consequences they have on income inequality 
and poverty.  
Negotiating IMF Program Conditionality  
 Nobody in either the IMF or the Mexican government had predicted that there 
was an imminent crisis in the early 1980s. IMF economists had expressed concerns about 
the rising levels of debt but the country’s booming oil industry mitigated these 
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concerns.129 Once the possibility of economic troubles became more apparent towards the 
middle of 1981, Mexico’s external public debt was already at a record high of $52.2 
billion USD, almost double its $26.4 billion debt in 1978.130 The initially high level of 
debt stemmed from the rise of populism in the country during the 1970s, which 
“accelerated public investment [and] increased social spending” and continued due to a 
lack of political will to increase taxes or reduce government spending.131 An additional 
$20 billion dollars in debt was added in the second half of 1981 and the first half of 1982 
in order to pay off the interest on its high level of debt.132  While the rapid rise in 
borrowing was concerning, the more important problem was the borrowing was only 
short term, and therefore a significant amount of the principal debt had to be paid back by 
1983. During this same 1978-1991 period, the operational deficit had also risen from 5.7 
percent of GDP to 9.8 percent.133  
The situation became even more concerning due to the fact that there was an 
upcoming presidential election in July 1982, and it would be extremely difficult to pass 
any tough changes until the new president was in office.134 Unfortunately the winner of 
this presidential election, Miguel de la Madrid, was not able to take office until 
December, despite the financial worries of the country.135 The IMF believed that the 
country would be able to avoid default until that time, but in mid-August “new money 
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dried up, and Mexico faced a crisis that could be resolved only through international 
coordination.”136 
 Mexico desperately needed external funding to avoid a default, which would have 
been a catastrophe to their economy, the economy of the United States, and the entire 
global financial structure. Therefore, the IMF took the lead in trying to work out a loan 
program for Mexico with the utmost urgency. After some initial negotiations, the IMF’s 
Managing Director told the Mexican representatives that the “program would have to be 
designed by the Mexican authorities themselves and would have to meet their own 
political as well as economic requirements.” This was going to be particularly difficult 
because the program “would have to be endorsed by both the outgoing and the incoming 
administrations” in addition to the other parties involved.137 The private banks that had 
been lending to Mexico were one of these important parties. The IMF determined that 
without their support and an additional flow of capital, Mexico would surely default, 
hurting everyone. It was therefore in the bank’s best interests to increase their lending to 
Mexico.138 
 After months of negotiations, the IMF and Mexico eventually reached an 
agreement on December 23, 1982 for $3.75 billion USD under the EFF extended 
arrangement facility. In addition to this, commercial banks had committed $4.3 billion in 
additional capital.139 The most pressing condition of the program was Mexico’s reduction 
in its fiscal deficit. The Mexican government agreed to reduce the fiscal deficit to 8.5 
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percent of GDP in 1983, from 16.5 percent in 1982.140 This was a huge reduction, and 
absolutely necessary in order to begin fixing the country’s debt crisis and regain growth 
after a negative 0.5 percent decline in GDP in 1982.141 After taking office Miguel De la 
Madrid also promoted “trade liberalization and privatization” as additional government 
objectives to improve the economy.142 These actions shifted the country away from the 
previous conflict between the populist governments and the domestic business elite and 
the “orthodox technical specialists in the Central Bank and Treasury.”143 De la Madrid’s 
background as one of these technical specialists allowed him to surround himself with 
people who “shared his views of fiscal conservatism” and therefore reduce the power of 
public enterprises and “reduce the allocation of subsidies to public firms.”144 While these 
were more long term strategies, the biggest and most energy consuming emphasis right 
after the crisis was on the reduction of the huge fiscal deficit in order to satisfy the IMF 
and help return growth to the country. 
Mexico’s Fiscal Reductions and Income Inequality 
 The extremely large decrease in the Mexican government’s fiscal deficit was 
inevitably going to hurt the poor and increase income inequality. Given that the IMF loan 
negotiations required only the support of the Mexican political and economic elite, and 
not the popular vote, it was highly likely that fiscal deficit reductions would increase 
income inequality in the following years. It is also worthwhile to note that Mexico was 
not a very wealthy country before this crisis hit. Despite its long period of economic 
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growth, “between 35 and 40% of household earned a total income below the prevailing 
minimum wage, approximately 19 million people suffered from malnutrition; the infant 
mortality rate was equal to 50 per 1,000 live births; and around 15% of the population 
was illiterate.145 Therefore, the effects of the 1982 crisis on poverty and inequality only 
heightened the existing levels that were present. This section will review the different 
elements of Mexico’s fiscal reduction and their consequences on income inequality and 
poverty. 
In order to decrease the fiscal deficit, the IMF had imposed conditions including 
“a new devaluation, increase in public revenues – via increase in indirect taxes as well as 
in the prices of public services – and highly restrictive credit and wage policies.”146 This 
led to a decline of 6.3 percent in GDP per capita in 1983, but did manage to reduce the 
public fiscal deficit by half.147 Over the period of 1982 – 1985, “GDP grew at an average 
of zero %; real wages were reduced by 30%; the wage share contracted by 10%; and 
social expenditures fell on average by 19%.”148 With a lack of new lending, “declining 
reserves, a plunge in oil prices, and a major new surge in inflation,” Mexico’s economy 
had not improved but had instead plunged back into recession by 1985.149  Therefore, 
while the austerity measures may have reduced the fiscal deficit, they did not fix the 
problem, but rather made income inequality worse in the country instead. 
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 In an attempt to increase government revenues, the Mexican government 
introduced a number of new taxes after the IMF loan. While these efforts were beneficial, 
especially those regarding the implementation a reformed VAT tax, they did not create a 
sizeable change for the government.150 This was most likely due to a significant amount 
of tax fraud and a narrow a tax base.151 While continuing to improve the tax system, 
especially in the enforcement and collection areas, would have been extremely beneficial, 
it was not politically feasible. Often times “Mexican private sector groups…used the 
threat of capital flight to veto government tax reform initiatives,” forcing the country to 
have “one of the lightest tax loads in the region.”152 Instead, the country focused more on 
revenue collection through higher prices for public goods and reductions in government 
expenditures. By increasing the prices for public goods and services, Mexico was able to 
increase its revenues to offset the decline in revenue from their lagging oil industry.153 
The most important components behind the fiscal reductions were the 
employment levels and the changes in wage income within Mexico. Real average wages 
decrease by 26.5 percent in 1983 and real minimum wages declined by 25.2 percent.154 
These decreases were the most severe of the three year IMF program. That being said, by 
1985 real wages had contracted by approximately 30 percent overall.155  This 
“contraction of personal income…virtually wiped out the gains in employment and 
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income that were made during the year of Mexico’s oil boom.”156 The Mexican 
government was able to decrease nominal minimum wages by pegging them to expected 
inflation, which was lower than actual inflation for that year. This meant that minimum 
wages were much lower than they had been in the past, which hurt the lower classes that 
would be working minimum wage jobs the most.  
Employment also declined significantly in the manufacturing and construction 
activities “which together comprise about 20% of total employment and 27% of 
nonagricultural employment.”157 Due to government cuts in capital expenditures, a 
decrease in construction employment and wages was the natural consequences as nothing 
new was being built. These reductions could have also been supplemented by a more 
aggressive strategy towards eliminating excess government positions.158 However, this 
did not occur because it would potentially threaten influential political leaders. While the 
overall unemployment rate did not plunge as drastically as it could have during such a 
large recession, the lower income population was still substantially hurt by the reductions 
in employment and the decreasing wage levels across every sector. 
The reduction of social expenditures was another of the main components of the 
stabilization plan that had significant consequences for income inequality. With a decline 
in revenues due to lower oil prices, and 40 percent of public expenditure going to debt 
servicing (15 percent increase from 1980-1981 levels), it was inevitable that the 
government would have to cut its expenditures on services such as health, education, 
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social security, and others.159 From 1980-1981, Mexico spent a total of 17 percent of 
public expenditures on social expenditures, which then dropped to 12.7 percent from 
1983-1985. This amounted to a decrease in per capita outlays of 24 percent for education, 
22 percent for health, and 37 percent for social security in comparison with the 1982 
levels.160  
While the quantity of services did not decline during this period, it is highly likely 
that teachers and doctors received significantly lower salaries. This could lead to lower 
human capital in these areas, and thus eventually a lower quality of service. Additionally, 
a decrease in capital expenditures “means not only that new capacity was not generated, 
but also that existing capacity was not properly maintained.”161 Therefore, while the level 
of services did not decline during this period, the social expenditure cuts most likely led 
to worse quality public services in the following years. It is possible that the reduction of 
capital expenditures associated with social programs was simply cutting programs with 
low social rates of return, but given the extent of the decreases, this is unlikely to have 
occurred for all of the reductions.162 
Mexico also greatly reduced its subsidies in order to decrease its expenditures to 
help fix the fiscal deficit. Subsidies for basic foodstuffs and public transportation 
declined from 6.5 percent in 1982 to 2.1 in 1987 as a percent of GNP.163 This occurred as 
the result of the push for the privatization of many state industries as a way of reducing 
governmental expenditures. By reducing subsidized prices and transfers to state 
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enterprises, they would make more revenue, cost less, and would be more prepared to be 
taken over by the private sector.164 In addition to the push for privatization, the 
government also used a reduction in subsidies as a way of cutting costs. The Mexican 
government decided to implement more targeted subsidies rather than having a general 
food subsidy. This mainly resulted in the elimination of the general subsidies for corn 
tortillas, “the staple of the popular diet.” Instead, a two tiered pricing system was set up. 
Additional subsidies on “cooking oil, bread, and eggs were also gradually eliminated.165 
While the leakage associated with these subsidies is not known, it is reasonable to assume 
that the majority of the people helped by these food subsidies are lower income. By 
eliminating these food subsidies, “the cost of the basic food basket [as a percentage of 
their minimum wage] rose from 30% in 1982 to over 50% in 1985”.166 This is an 
extremely large increase for basic food necessities, and therefore the reductions of the 
subsidies, while most likely necessary to reduce the fiscal deficit, had significant 
consequences on the income and health of the poor. These factors clearly contributed to 
the increase in income inequality in Mexico. 
The poor and middle classes as well as small and private entrepreneurs “bore the 
brunt of both stabilization and structural adjustment. The 50 percent drop in real wages 
from 1982-1988, rising unemployment and a 70 percent cut on popular consumption 
subsidies during the first three years led to a very socially discontent country.167 
However, despite these changes the Mexican people did not violently demonstrate against 
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the government. Instead, the majority of the people dedicated more hours to working and 
creating more diversified sources of income. Rather than lashing out against the 
government in frustration, there was a general “’retreat to the household’” and a focus on 
finding ways to cope with the economic downturn.168 This was not the case in the 
Dominican Republic, where riots after IMF imposed price increases “left 60 dead, 200 
wounded, and 4,300 arrested.”169 Therefore, these opposing reactions show how volatile 
economic reforms can potentially be, and events could have gotten a lot worse in Mexico 
if there had also been as significant a civil unrest. This attitude definitely maintained the 
stability of the country, but most likely hurt income inequality by allowing the 
government and interest groups to determine their fate without standing up for their rights 
and wages. 
 While the country managed to decrease its fiscal deficit leading after receiving the 
IMF loan, these fiscal reductions inevitably led to an increase in income inequality and 
poverty in the country. Essentially Mexico conducted a meaningful reform right after the 
1982 crisis, but after 1983 “fiscal and monetary policies were eased significantly” due to 
the upcoming midterm presidential elections in 1985.170 Without the political 
commitment to structural change, there was a lack of economic growth and a large 
increase in inflation, which lead to additional economic problems in 1985. At this point, 
the government was unable to meet the IMF’s performance criteria, which resulted in the 
suspension of further loan credits.171 The government then “had no choice but to take the 
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medicine and to suffer the political consequences’ of additional reform. This resulted in 
another round of “state divestitures, the replacement of import licenses by tariffs, the 
elimination of quantitative controls on imports, and the withdrawal of many subsidies.”172 
While Mexico eventually recovered in 1989, it was not a great decade overall, especially 
for inequality, which rose from 46.3 in 1984 to 55.1 in 1989 based on the GINI 
coefficient.173 The case of Mexico in the 1980s demonstrated how negotiations between 
the IMF and the borrowing country and internal politics play an incredibly large role in 
the conditions and implementation of IMF loans. These decisions help those in power, 
while hurting the poor and middle classes and increasing income inequality. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUDING REMARKS AND POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Following the Third World Debt Crisis in 1982, the number of IMF conditions 
attached to its loans vastly increased, yet Latin America still suffered a series of further 
crisis throughout the 1990s and into the early 2000s. These countries were hurt by 
unsustainable government policies, increased openness to global trade and capital flows 
and a low rate of compliance with IMF conditions. This low rate of compliance and the 
clear failures of increased conditionality led to a push for streamlining conditionality in 
the beginning of the 2000s. By reducing the number of conditions, the IMF felt that it 
would allow countries to increase the ownership of addressing their balance of payments 
problems, thus increasing the level of compliance with the conditions that were deemed 
essential to the success of the program.174 
The high amount of conditions were also criticized because they imposed external 
pressure to force a country to implement changes, and therefore, infringing upon the 
country’s sovereignty. However, this hypothesis seems questionable when only the elites 
and politicians determine how the country will implement these changes. These decisions 
made in the realm of internal politics often focus on maintaining the current level of 
power, and thus the brunt of the reforms falls on the poor, and less politically influential 
groups. It would therefore be more appropriate to deem conditionality as a restriction on 
the elites to decide whether or not to benefit themselves or the country as a whole.  
While this may not always be the case, it is important to understand that 
conditions do not necessarily have to be a negative action. If politicians and elites are 
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able to enact the necessary reforms and ensure a fair distribution of burden to fix the 
economy, then there is no need for IMF conditions.175 However, if the government 
determines that staying in power is more important than these other factors, conditions 
are required to force them to comply. This provides an interesting complexity to IMF 
lending and conditionality, especially regarding the buy-in of the governments for certain 
reforms, because the entire point of conditions is to force the governments to do 
something that they would not do on their own without the condition. Therefore, the 
underlying problem was not that there were too many conditions (assuming that the IMF 
had determined conditions that would have been beneficial to the country), but that the 
governments were simply not choosing to follow through with the conditions they had 
originally agreed to. This low rate of compliance was for two reasons: a lack of 
incentives from the IMF, and internal politics. 
Streamlining conditionality was a clear indicator that the IMF recognized the high 
levels of conditionality had not helped to fix the problem, and was trying to encourage 
more countries to lend from them under less restricted terms. This demonstrates that 
while the IMF wants to ensure that financial crises are solved in the most efficient 
manner possible, the institution as a whole wants to give out loans. Otherwise, the 
institution would have no purpose whatsoever. While it seems intuitive that the IMF 
should want to give loans, it is actually an underlying problem that affects the success of 
their programs. By caring about giving out a loan for the sake of distributing money - 
whether or not this motivation is in addition to a demonstrated need – the IMF 
undermines its bargaining power with the countries it is negotiating with. Conditionality 
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is the way that the IMF tries to ensure that the government implements beneficial 
economic policies, but without strict consequences for failing to meet conditionality 
benchmarks, the governments of borrowing countries have very little incentive to actually 
follow through with their agreements. Governments of borrowing countries are very 
calculating and they understand that the IMF will simply renegotiate their loans if they 
fail to meet set criteria. This allows them to implement policies that are most beneficial to 
themselves, and their political support base, regardless of whether or not it is in line with 
IMF conditions, or is beneficial for the country as a whole. Therefore, it is important to 
understand that these governments are not helpless, but rather have significant leverage 
and power when working with the IMF and determining the implementation of their 
policies.176 
Governments of borrowing countries have a significant amount of power over 
determining how IMF loan conditions will be implemented, and therefore the role of 
internal politics is extremely important as well. After accepting an IMF loan, the 
government then has to determine how it is going to implement reforms while attempting 
to navigate through all of the various interest groups, political opposition, and the citizens 
of the country. The most probable scenario is that political “elites are reluctant to make 
policy alternations that threaten their constituencies” and could harm their chances of 
staying in power. For this same reason, “politicians prefer to proceed incrementally 
because they fear that they will have to take on many groups at once.”177 Given the 
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intense pressures that these governments face because of the fact that they are in an 
economic crisis and are losing some sovereignty to an external organization, it makes 
perfect sense that these decisions are based around political support more than economic 
benefits. This also illustrates why governments so often do not implement, or only 
partially implement adjusts required by IMF loan conditions.178 By delaying 
implementation, the government gets to benefit in the short run by continuing providing 
services for the people, but at the expense of the long term growth and equality in the 
long run. However, if the government does have to implement reforms, they will make 
sure that they protect the powerful elites to ensure political support. While there is such a 
strong fear of losing power, interestingly enough, regime collapses and “large-scale and 
persistent instability” are rarely ever caused by “the acceptance and implementation of 
IMF policies.”179 While these factors are highly influential, it is very difficult to 
“understand fully how such political factors might alter the effects of the IMF” and its 
programs on income inequality and poverty.180 
 As the IMF has implemented the more streamlined conditionality, they have 
attempted to increase the borrowing country’s ownership of the reforms, and therefore 
make the changes necessary to fix their balance of payments disequilibria and foster 
growth. However, there are still other underlying factors that must still be addressed in 
order to improve the IMF conditionality outcomes on income inequality. Two important 
factors are the lack of time to produce the most efficient programs in crisis situations, and 
the concreteness of the IMF’s role as a financial only institution.  
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During, or right before, an economic crisis of any magnitude, there is an obvious 
sense of urgency to fix the problem as soon as possible. With such a high degree of 
urgency it is impossible to fully think through the problem, and come up with the most 
appropriate solution for the country’s economic wellbeing, let alone ensuring that income 
inequality does not rise significantly and the poor are not disproportionately hurt during 
this process. This sense of urgency occurred in the 1982 Mexican case, and the ultimate 
product was a hastily put together program that did not address many crucial elements to 
the reform of the Mexican economy Income inequality rose, and the poor were hurt 
because of it. One might argue that the IMF learns from every past crisis, and is therefore 
better equipped to make faster decisions, but in reality every crisis has its own unique set 
of circumstances that make it different from previous crises.  
Given that the IMF is a “’monetary not a development institution’” the priority 
will always remain in fixing the country’s balance of payment problems.181 Ensuring that 
that income inequality and poverty do not significantly rise in the country will be a very 
difficult challenge during these crisis situations, unless the IMF takes a stronger stance on 
ensuring these factors become a part of their policy packages. This is remains highly 
unlikely despite the potential impacts that the IMF could have by focusing on a combined 
effort to fix balance of payments problems, and ensure that inequality and poverty do not 
disproportionately rise during this time. 
Despite these challenges, the IMF has viable options that can not only improve 
the success rate of its loans, but also ensure that inequality and poverty are not severely 
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hurt in the process. One of these ways is by adding conditions to loans that restrict the 
reductions in certain sectors that would disproportionately hurt the poor. While the IMF 
would surely have an incredibly difficult time trying to force governments to place a 
higher level of burden on the elites, they may be successful in at least ensuring the 
poorest are still provided for. The IMF has recently implemented a number of loan 
facilities aimed at reducing poverty, including the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility 
(PRGF). There have also been studies that have shown countries under the ESAF 
programs “have a more ‘pro-poor’ mix of stabilization policies and greater ‘social 
capacity.’” Additionally, “government expenditure on health and education seems to be 
more protected and regressive tax policies less likely.”182 Despite not being a 
development agency, the IMF does have the ability to create positive impacts during its 
programs. 
The IMF would also benefit from taking a longer term view on growth and 
income inequality, despite the immediate and daunting tasks they face during periods of 
crisis. Similarly to capital expenditures, income inequality and poverty may be easy to 
put aside and ignore and in the short run, but will have huge long term impacts on the 
country and its economic growth. Governments understand the value of these longer term 
investments, but they also tend to be the most politically appealing areas to reduce due to 
the fact that the majority of the consequences will not be apparent until later in the future 
when they are out of office. While addressing poverty and inequality in the short run may 
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be costly, the costs could be much higher for the country in the forms of reduced growth 
and distribution social tension.183  
There are two ways in which the IMF could help improve income inequality and 
poverty during its programs: 1) strict conditions that force governments to address these 
issues and 2) utilizing foreign aid and the World Bank to cover short term budget cuts to 
social services. Throughout this paper the inadequacies of conditionality have been 
expressed, and therefore it is unlikely that conditions regarding income inequality and 
poverty will be any more effective than the governments would do themselves. The 
second option is more intriguing. The argument, posed by Bird, is that income inequality 
and poverty increase during IMF programs due to the fact that governments184 cater to the 
elite and thus disproportionately hurt the poor during the implementation of reforms. 
Given that governments will be highly unlikely to change this self-serving manner of 
business, the IMF could attract foreign aid, from the World Bank or other development 
agencies, to supplement its loan with aid. This would “fill budgetary gaps” and cushion 
“living standards against a decline in output” and thus ensure the poor do not become 
worse off during this period of time. While this would require the approval of the 
borrowing country, this seems to be the most viable option for taking a holistic approach 
to fixing a country’s balance of payments problems, and ensuring the wellbeing of the 
people. 
The high levels of inequality in Latin America, the ever increasing global 
financial integration, and the current economic volatility in Europe, pose serious threats 
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for Latin America as a region despite its recent successes. The past decades and 
numerous IMF loan programs have failed to address income inequality and poverty, but 
have finally managed to get their economies on track. It is essential for the future 
prosperity of the region that the IMF make these crucial reforms before the next crisis 
emerges in Latin America. By addressing income inequality and poverty, in addition to 
the balance of payments problems, the IMF will be able to not only fix the crisis, but 
invest in the future growth of the country, and the region. 
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